Abstract. Piece in Hand method is a security enhancement method for Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs). Since 2004, many types of this method have been proposed. In this paper, we consider the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method as proposed by Tsuji et al. in 2009. The key point of this method is to introduce an invertible quadratic polynomial map on the plaintext variables to construct perturbation of the original MPKC. Through our analysis, we find that the security of the enhanced scheme is mainly relying on the quadratic polynomials of this auxiliary map. The two examples proposed by Tsuji et al. for this map can not resist the Linearization Equation attack. Given a valid ciphertext, we can easily get a public key which is equivalent to the original MPKC. If there is an algorithm that can recover the plaintext corresponding to a valid ciphertext of the original MPKC, we can construct an algorithm that can recover the plaintext corresponding to a valid ciphertext of the enhanced MPKC.
Introduction
Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs) are promising candidates to resist the quantum computer attack [1] . The security of these schemes is based on the difficulty of solving systems of multivariate quadratic (MQ) equations over a finite field, which is an NP-hard problem in general.
Since 1988, many MPKCs have been proposed, such as MI [15] , HFE [20] , MFE [26] , TTM [16] , Rainbow [5] , MQQ [13] etc. However, many of these schemes have shown to be insecure [19, 11, 6, 17, 2, 14] . In order to enhance the security of MPKCs, many enhancement methods were proposed. There are plus/minus [22, 21] , internal perturbation [3, 4] , Extended Multivariate public key Cryptosystems (EMC) [27] etc. All of these methods are subjected to different levels of attacks [12, 7, 9, 8, 18] .
Piece in Hand (PH) method is another security enhancement method introduced and studied in a series of papers [23, 24, 10, 25] . In [25] , Tsuji et al. proposed the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method. For this, they introduced two vectors of polynomials: an auxiliary polynomial vector and a perturbation polynomial vector. The perturbation polynomial vector is used to add perturbation to the underlying MPKC, whereas the auxiliary polynomial vector is constructed to be efficiently invertible which will be used during the decryption process.
Since the information of the auxiliary polynomial vector is part of the public key, the security of the whole scheme relies on the structure of this vector. In their paper [25] , the authors gave two examples for this vector, called H 1 and H 2 .
In this paper we show that both H 1 and H 2 satisfy Linearization Equations (LEs) of the form
where x i are the plaintext variables and y j are the ciphertext variables.
After finding all the LEs and substituting a valid ciphertext into these equations, we can get a system of linear equations in the plaintext variables. By solving this system, we can represent some of the plaintext variables by linear combinations of the other plaintext variables. Hence, we can do elimination on the public key. And we can perform a similar analysis on the eliminated public key to check if there are Linearization Equations satisfied by the simplified public key.
In the case of H 1 , given a valid ciphertext, we can, after two eliminations on the public key, find a public key equivalent to that of the original MPKC. In the case of H 2 , given a valid ciphertext, we can achieve the same goal using three eliminations on the public key. This means that Piece in Hand method using these two auxiliary polynomial vectors can not enhance the security of the underlying MPKC. So, we must be very careful when designing the auxiliary polynomial vector of PH method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description of MPKCs and Linearization Equations. Section 3 introduces the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method. In Section 4, we present our cryptanalysis of the enhanced scheme and present the results of our computer experiments. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries

Multivariate Public Key Cryptography
To build a multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), one starts with an easily invertible map F : F n → F m (central map). To hide the structure of F in the public key, one combines it with two invertible affine maps T :
and U : F n → F n . Therefore the public key has the form
The private key consists out of the three maps T , F and U and therefore allows to invert the public key.
Linearization Equations
For MPKCs, a Linearization Equation (LE) is an equation in the n + m plaintext/ciphertext variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m of the form
where 
Note that, given a valid ciphertext y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ), we can substitute it into equation (3) to get a linear equation in the plaintext variables. By finding all these equations we get a linear system which can be solved by Gaussian Elimination. After having found a solution, we can do elimination on the public key.
2-Layer Piece in Hand Method
We use the same notation as in [25] . Let E : F n → F m be the public map of a multivariate public key encryption scheme with {x 1 , . . . , x n } and {y 1 , . . . , y m } being the plaintext and ciphertext variables repectively and l be a positive integer.
To enhance the security of the MPKC, the inventors of the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method introduced an auxiliary polynomial vector H of l components and a perturbation polynomial vector J . The elements of the auxiliary polynomial vector H are products of two random linear polynomials h i and h j , where the functions h i are given by
with s ij ∈ R F. The perturbation polynomial vector J is a vector with l(l − 1)/2 components constructed from the polynomials h i · h j (1 ≤ i < j ≤ l). Note that the polynomial components of the vector H are designed to be easily invertible for decryption. Therefore, one can use the vector H to compute the values of h i (i = 1, . . . , l) and sequentially calculate the value of the vector J . By the above construction, one gets an enhanced public keyẼ :
where
matrix over F, and C is an l × l invertible matrix over F.
Secret Key:
The secret key includes -the secret key of the underlying MPKC -the matrices B, C and D -the auxiliary polynomial vector H and -the perturbation polynomial vector J .
Public Key:
The m + l components of the functionẼ.
Decryption: Given a valid ciphertext y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+l ), decryption includes the following steps:
Compute the value of J by substituting the values of
Examples for the auxiliary vector H and the perturbation vector J
In [25] , the authors gave two examples for the choice of the auxiliary vector H, denoted by H 1 and H 2 , respectively. For arbitrary l, the vector H 1 is given by
with α 1 , . . . , α l ∈ R F. For our experiments (see Subsection 4.3) we use the value l = 8. Apparently, given the value of the vector (u 1 , . . . , u l ), we can get from the first three equations of (6)
and then get the values of h 2 , h 3 , . . . , h l in turn.
For the auxiliary map H 2 , the value l is fixed to 15. We have
where α i ∈ R F (i = 1, . . . , l). Similarly to H 1 , H 2 can be easily inverted. The perturbation vector J used in [25] is given as follows:
. . .
Cryptanalysis of the 2-Layer PH Method
Although the perturbation map J can hide the weak point of the underlying MPKC scheme, the security of the enhanced scheme depends mainly on the design of the auxiliary map H. Bad design of the vector H will bring some new security problems to the scheme. Both vectors H 1 and H 2 of [25] are not properly chosen to enhance the security of the underlying scheme, since they satisfy Linearization Equations.
In this section, we present our cryptanalysis of the 2-layer PH method with auxiliary polynomial vector H 1 and H 2 , respectively. Given a valid ciphertext
T , our goal is to find the corresponding plaintext. Namely, we have to solve the system
Case of H 1
Through theoretical analysis, we find that the systemẼ satisfies Linearization Equations, which are brought in by the vector H 1 . Given a valid ciphertext we can, after finding all FOLEs, recover the corresponding plaintext easily.
Linearization Equations
In the expression of the polynomial vector H 1 (see (6)), we have
Hence we get 
This equation is exactly a FOLE. Similarly, from each of the pairs
, we can get an additional FOLE. Hence there exist at least (l − 2)(l − 1)/2 + 1 linear independent Linearization Equations of type (12) . To find these FOLEs, we randomly generate D 1 ≥ n(m + l) + n + m + l + 1 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substitute them into equation (12) . By doing so, we get a system of D 1 linear equations in the n(m + l) + n + m + l + 1 unknowns a ij , b i , c j and d which can be solved by Gaussian Elimination. We denote the solution space by V and its dimension by D. Hence, we derive D linearly independent equations of type (12) in the plaintext and ciphertext variables.
The work above depends only on the public key and can be done once for a given public key.
By substituting the given ciphertext y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+l ) into the Linearization Equations found above we get D linear equations in the plaintext variables. Let's assume that t 1 of these equations are linearly independent.
First Elimination
By substituting the t 1 equations found above into the public keyẼ of the 2-layer nonlinear PH scheme, we can eliminate t 1 equations fromẼ. By doing so, we get a simplified public keyẼ of the form
Second Elimination
In the practical setting of [25] , the characteristic of the underlying field F was chosen to be 2. Using this property, we can find another type of Linearization Equations satisfied by the simplified public keyẼ .
We denote by u i (i = 1, . . . , l) the value of u i corresponding to the given ciphertext y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+l ). Such we get
According to FOLEs similar to equation (11), we find
By substituting (15) into (6), we get
Due to
. . , l) and using the fact that squaring is a linear operation on a field of characteristic 2, we have at least one equation satisfied by ciphertext variables and the remaining plaintext variables of the form
It is easy to solve the above linear system for theã i ,b j andc. Let {ã
basis of the solution space of the system (17). Set
For any vector w = (w 1 , . . . w n−t1 ), w and the corresponding ciphertext (y 1 , . . . , y m+l ) =Ẽ (w) satisfy equation (18) . Therefore we can represent at least one variable of the set {w 1 , . . . , w n−t1 } as a linear equation in the remaining variables. Denote the remaining variables by v 1 , . . . , v n−t1−1 . Substituting this linear expression into the system (13), we can get a new public key with (n − t 1 − 1) unknowns, denoted as
Eliminating Perturbation
Furthermore, after two eliminations, the vector J becomes a constant vector, namely, the perturbation of Piece in Hand method is eliminated. The reason for this is shown as follows. From (16), we get
Substituting (20) and (15) into (9), the vector J becomes a constant vector on F. For example,
Hence, the public keyẼ of equation (19) is equivalent to the public key of the underlying MPKC scheme. If there exists an algorithm which recovers the plaintext corresponding to a valid ciphertext for the underlying MPKC scheme, we can therefore find the values of the variables v 1 , . . . , v n−t1−1 corresponding to the valid ciphertext y . Using the linear equations found during the two eliminations above, we can recover the values of the remaining plaintexts variables.
Case of H 2
Let y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+15 ) be a valid ciphertext of the Piece in Hand MPKC with auxiliary map H 2 . Again we want to find the corresponding plaintext x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) by solving the system (10) .
Similarly to the case of H 1 , from the first five equations in (8), we can get five FOLEs between u i and
Apparently, these five equations are linearly independent. Hence, we can get at least five Linearization Equations satisfied by plain-and ciphertext variables of the form (12) . Using the same method as in Subsection 4.1, we do the first elimination on the system (10). Suppose we eliminated t 1 ≥ 4 variables in the system. Denote the remaining plaintext variables by w 1 , . . . , w n−t1 and let
be the simplified public key. Using a similar method as in Subsection 4.1, we can perform two additional eliminations on the system (21). Due to the limitation of paper size, we omit the details of this part here. We will present them in the full version of this paper. But we should point out the following facts.
For the public keyẼ j (w 1 , . . . , w n−t1 ), plain-and ciphertext variables satisfy equations of the form
By substituting the ciphertext y into these equations and using the fact that squaring is a linear function over fields of characteristic 2, we can find t 2 ≥ 6 linear equations in the plaintext variables. We can therefore eliminate t 2 variables from the public key. After this elimination, the simplified public key has the form
The public keyẼ satisfies equations of the form
By substituting the ciphertext y into these equations, we can find t 3 ≥ 5 linear equations in the variables v 1 , . . . , v n−t1−t2 . Therefore, we can eliminate t 3 variables from the system (23) and get a new public keyẼ of the form
For the public keyẼ , the perturbation vector J becomes a constant vector. Hence,Ẽ is equivalent to the public key of the underlying MPKC.
Analogously to Subsection 4.1 we can therefore, under the assumption that there exists an algorithm which, for the underlying MPKC, finds for a given ciphertext the corresponding plaintext, construct an algorithm which, for any given ciphertext y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+15 ), recovers the corresponding plaintext x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Complexity and Experimental Verification
In our concrete attack scenario we set F = GF (256) and m = n = 25. As the underlying MPKC we used the C scheme of Matsumoto and Imai. We implemented the Piece in Hand cryptosystem in two different ways using H 1 (with l = 8) and H 2 as auxiliary matrix respectively. For our attack we chose randomly a valid ciphertext y = (y 1 , . . . , y m+l ) ∈ F m+l . Our goal was to find the corresponding plaintext x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n .
Case of H 1 . In the first step we computed 900 (> n(m+l)+n+m+l+1 = 884) plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (12) . We did Gaussian Elimination on this linear system and found a basis of all FOLEs. The complexity of the Gaussian Elimination is equal to (n(m + l) + n + m + l + 1) 3 operations on the finite field F. In our experiments,
We found that the dimension of the space spanned by all FOLEs is D = (l − 2)(l − 1)/2 = 22.
Computing the plaintext/ciphertext pairs and solving this large linear system proved to be the most time-consuming step of our attack. In our experiments, it took about 70 seconds, where it took about 68 seconds on generating the plaintext/ciphertext pairs and about 2 seconds on the Gaussian Elimination. This step is independent of the given ciphertext y and has to be done for a given public key only once. After substituting the ciphertext y into these equations we obtained 7 linear equations in the plaintext variables.
In the second step we computed 100 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (17) . By doing so, we got 15 linearly independent equations of the form (17) . By evaluating equation (18), we got 1 linear equation in the plaintext variables.
We substituted the 8 linear equations found in the previous steps into the public key and obtained a new public keyẼ of 33 equations in 17 variables, which proved to be of the form of a C public key (i.e. the perturbation was eliminated).
In the last step of the attack, we attacked the new public keyẼ with the Linearization Equation attack of Patarin [19] . We computed 500 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (12) . By doing so, we got 25 linear independent equations of type (12) . After substituting the ciphertext y we obtained 17 linear equations in the plaintext variables which enabled us to reconstruct the plaintext x .
The running time of the whole attack was about 90 seconds.
Case of H 2 . In the first step we computed 1100 (> (n(m+15)+n+m+15+1) = 1066) plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (12) . We solved the resulting linear system for the variables a ij , b i , c j and d to find a basis of all FOLEs. By doing so, we found 5 linear independent Linearization Equations. After substituting the ciphertext y into these equations we obtained 4 linear equations in the plaintext variables. The complexity of this step is equal to 1066 3 ≤ 2 31 . It took about 104 seconds in our experiments, where it took about 102 seconds on generating the plaintext/ciphertext pairs and about 2 second on the Gaussian Elimination. This step has to be performed for each public key only once.
In the second step we computed 100 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (22) . By doing so, we got 14 linear independent equations of form (22) . After substituting the ciphertext y , we got 6 linear equations in the plaintext variables.
In the third step we computed again 100 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (24) . We obtained 25 linear independent equations. By substituting the ciphertext y into these equations, we got 5 linear equations in the plaintext variables.
We substituted the 15 linear equations found in the previous steps into the public key and obtained a new public keyẼ of 40 equations in 10 variables, which proved to be of the form of a C public key (i.e. the perturbation was eliminated).
In the last step of the attack, we attacked the new keyẼ with the Linearization Equation attack of Patarin [19] . We computed 500 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and substituted them into the Linearization Equation of type (12) . By doing so, we obtained 25 linear independent equations. After substituting the ciphertext y we got 10 linear equations in the plaintext variables which enabled us to reconstruct the plaintext x .
The running time of the whole attack was about 127 seconds. All experiments were performed on a server with 24 AMD Opteron processors and 128 GB RAM. However, for our experiments we used only a single core. The attack was programmed in Magma code and required about 120 MB of memory.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the cryptanalysis of two examples of the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method. As we showed, both examples do not enhance the security of the underlying MPKC because they can not resist Linearization Equation attacks. From this paper, we find that the security of the 2-layer nonlinear Piece in Hand method depends mainly on the construction of the auxiliary polynomial vector H. We should therefore design the auxiliary polynomial vector H in such a way that it resists existing attacks.
